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NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY
While unsound fiscal policies in several euro area countries have been one of the main triggers for the current sovereign debt crisis in Europe, fiscal imprudence was not the only cause. In fact, some of the countries in the euro area which have been hardest hit by the current financial turbulences -for example Ireland and Spain -have featured comparatively low government debt levels and even run fiscal surpluses before the crisis. A closer look at countries' current and financial account development reveals that imbalances of another form had been building up since the start of EMU, largely unnoticed -or benignly neglected -by policy makers: large current account deficits and surpluses.
Current account deficits are often interpreted as reflecting a lack of competitiveness. In this context, it is however important to distinguish between the impact a government can have on competitiveness, on the one hand, and the general impact of market processes like wage negotiations and interest rate developments on competitiveness, on the other hand.
Disentangling market-induced and politics-induced changes in competitiveness is not easy, but strongly warranted given that some euro area countries are currently under pressure to improve their competitive position both at the factor price level and through adjusting policy variables. A better distinction between factor price-induced and policy-induced competitiveness developments may also be relevant in the context of the Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure that was recently introduced as a new instrument of EU economic surveillance. More generally, increasing country competitiveness is one of the key objectives currently discussed by policy makers in the context of strengthening economic union in the euro area, to complement monetary union.
Governments competing among themselves for factors of production face the incentive to adjust key policy variables like market regulations to improve their competitive position. The theory of systems competition gives guidance regarding the intuitional variables that determine a country's competitive position and which are under the direct influence of governments.
Against this background, we argue that for well-founded policy recommendations the political dimension should be evaluated separately from factor price-driven developments. To obtain a better understanding of what drives competitiveness within countries and across countries, we construct a new measure of competitiveness for the EU and some OECD countries that provides an exclusive focus on the policy variables. We introduce the term 'institutional competitiveness' for this new concept of competitiveness. The new 'index of institutional competitiveness' only contains variables under direct influence by policy makers.
The index shows that the individual components of institutional competitiveness have not developed homogenously among euro area countries. To explain these divergent developments, the uneven integration within the EU Single Market may play a role. Systems competition among euro area countries seems to have had a stronger impact in areas that are of particular relevance for the single market such as infrastructure, and in areas where the single market had been most consistently implemented, in particular capital movements. In contrast, system competition appears to have had less of an impact in markets which are less integrated, in particular labour markets.
Institutional Competitiveness of euro area countries has increased most strongly since the mid1990s. Our paper finds that 'Southern' euro area countries caught up in the 1990s in terms of Institutional Competitiveness with 'Northern' euro area countries. However, as they could not ensure a pronounced institutional competitive edge, the gap between 'Northern' and Southern' euro area countries in terms of Factor Price Competitiveness ultimately remained constant.
Indeed, as factor price differentials result from different returns to investment, relative factor prices should not change if relative fundamentals do not change.
Our analysis of the Institutional Competitiveness Index suggests that competitiveness is not only a decision variable for firms, but perhaps even more so, for governments.
INTRODUCTION
While the on-going sovereign debt crisis in Europe is often primarily associated with fiscally imprudent policies in a number of euro area countries, the underlying economic developments are surprisingly heterogeneous and difficult to pin down. Indeed, some of the countries in the euro area which have been hardest hit by the current financial turbulences -for example Ireland and Spain -have featured comparatively low government debt levels and even run fiscal surpluses before the crisis. A closer look at countries' current and financial account development reveals that imbalances of another form had been building up since the start of EMU, largely unnoticed -or benignly neglected -by policy makers: large current account deficits and surpluses.
Often enough current account deficits are taken as a sign of a lack of competitiveness. In this context, it is however important to distinguish between the impact a government can have on competitiveness, on the one hand, and the general impact of market processes like wage negotiation and interest rate developments on competitiveness, on the other hand. In this paper we construct a new measure of competitiveness that provides an exclusive focus on institutional competitiveness. We construct a new 'index of institutional competitiveness' which only contains variables under direct influence by policy makers. The comparison with established indicators for competitiveness such as the WEF Global Competitiveness Index shows that largely factor-price driven indicators capture indeed only insufficiently institutional developments that have an impact on the relative competitive positions of countries.
The index also allows exploring more in detail the underlying drivers of competitiveness within countries and across countries. For instance, while EMU Member States were able to maintain a competitive edge over non-EMU EU countries in terms of factor price competitiveness, the latter caught up in terms of institutional competitiveness. Similar developments occurred within EMU between 'Northern' and 'Southern' euro area countries. A better distinction between factor price-induced and policy-induced competitiveness developments may also be relevant in the context of the Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure that was recently introduced as a new instrument of EU economic surveillance to identify and address adverse developments in competitiveness.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents our motivation and explains the theoretical considerations underlying the paper. Section 3 explains how the new Index for Institutional Competitiveness is constructed. In Section 4 we explore the value added that the index brings for empirical analysis. Section 5 concludes.
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MOTIVATION AND THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
When countries form an integrated market, they most importantly abolish barriers to trade of goods and services, but -as in the case of the EU Single Market -they have also facilitated the free flow of capital and labour across borders. As a consequence, countries face increased international competition for capital and labour. The effect can be expected to be even more pronounced when this process of economic integration is accompanied by monetary integration.
Monetary union lowers the transaction cost for cross-border capital relocations even more and abolishes the exchange rates risk, especially for periphery countries with a history of nominal devaluations. This further intensifies competition for capital and, importantly, foreign direct investment (FDI). Hence, by entering monetary union governments enter a competition for capital inflows, not only carried out through factor costs -wages and interest rates -but also through the optimal set of institutions, i.e. regulation, taxation or infrastructure. The competition for the best set of institutions has been termed 'systems competition' (Sinn 2003) .
The following variables are typically considered as the key drivers of capital flows into a certain economy (see inter alia Furceri et al. 2011; Jevčák et al. 2010; Fratzscher 2011 institutional factors (quality of the legal system, infrastructure etc).
Upon entry into a monetary union such as the euro area, the first three factors -the exchange rate, the interest rate and capital account openness -cease to be relevant for decisions of market participants choosing between one of the member countries of the monetary union as investment destination. The exchange rate risk naturally disappears. Furthermore, through the conduct of a single monetary policy, interest rate differentials at the short end disappear in a monetary union.
Beyond that, as witnessed in EMU, a very strong convergence of interest rates at the long end set in, driven by capital flows from 'core' to 'periphery' countries' as a consequence of optimistic market perceptions and a widespread neglect of country risks. While typically the 6 reserve account will force adjustment upon countries that finance large current account deficits through capital imports over prolonged periods, this direct constraint is absent within a monetary union. That said, as the current crisis has illustrated, other constraints will materialise over time, given that EMU is not a fiscal transfer union.
The disappearance of exchange rate and interest rate differentials implies that relatively more weight will be put on the remaining factor listed above. As geographical factors fall outside the remit of policy discretion, policy makers trying to make their country more competitive are likely to concentrate on production factors and institutional factors to influence market conditions and attract investment. Policy makers can react to increased competition for capital within a monetary union with two sets of strategic variables which are at the core of 'systems competition'. First, they can set policy variables like tax rates on labour, social benefits and wage setting mechanisms to affect unit labour costs. In addition, governments can reduce tax rates on capital income or exempt certain profit streams from taxation in order to decrease the cost of capital. As a consequence, governments end up in a competition for investment that drives down tax rates and social benefits, potentially to inefficiently low levels (Zodrow and Mieszkowski 1986; Haufler and Wooton 1999; Köthenbürger 2002; Devereux et al. 2008; Oates 2001 provides an overview of the debate).
Second, policy makers can affect the competitive position of national firms in the international market by relaxing regulation. In a closed economy it is sensible to have laws that endorse competition in various sectors of the economy. In a globalised world, however, governments may refer to active industrial policies to promote 'national champions'. For example, governments can relax anti-trust legislation to increase the market share of a national conglomerate (Sinn 2003) or relax the regulation of certain economic sectors to establish national companies as key players on the European market (Dell'Ariccia and Marquez, 2006) .
However, while deregulation of economic sectors may unleash growth potential, such policy steps are undesirable in particular if a government relaxes regulation where it initially was in place to overcome market failure because of market power or external effects (Sinn 1997) . In other words, while more competition at firm level can enhance overall welfare through higher productivity, more competition at regulatory level can prove counterproductive when regulation was intended to improve the functioning of markets. Looking beyond the domestic perspective, such beggar-thy-neighbour policies constitute a negative externality on other countries and can foster the building up of current and financial accounts imbalances. In this vein, the overall economic and welfare effects of enhanced system competition among governments need to be assessed from a broader perspective that goes beyond a purely microeconomic analysis (Sinn 2003) .
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By exploiting the leeway offered by differing systems of national governance, countries try to gain or maintain a comparative advantage through targeting key macroeconomic variables.
These different national 'systems' could be described as different 'business models' that compete for investment and growth (one possible schematic classification of such country models, and their efficiency, is provided in Sapir 2006) . In a country with a high savings rate and low domestic consumption, it is natural to seek a comparative advantage in export-driven growth by maintaining low relative labour costs (Wyplosz 2010 
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS
In section 2 we have defined the concept of institutional competitiveness as the attractiveness of the overall institutional framework of a country for economic agents who engage in economic activities there. According to classical economic theory, an economic agent is interested in optimising the profit of his/her activities. The institutional competitiveness of a country is therefore closely related to the profit maximisation problem of a firm. An investor prefers the country among several which offers the best conditions for the firm's specific profit maximisation problem.
In a simple form, the profit maximisation problem of a firm reads max p f(z) − w • z where p scalar denoting a firm's output price w vector of input prices z vector of input goods f (z) production function giving the maximum amount of output that can be produced with the input vector z
The institutional framework of a country can affect the profit maximisation problem in a variety of ways by altering either the availability and prices of inputs, the production technology or the output price. For example, the availability and price of the important input factor labour may be affected by labour market regulation. Or the decision by the government to build a new highway may increase the availability and decrease the price of an important raw material. Therefore, an index of institutional competitiveness should capture how the institutional framework of a country influences the different elements of a firm's production function. Based on these theoretical considerations we decide to structure our index of institutional competitiveness along the components of the profit maximisation problem. For the output side we consider product market regulation. Among the public input goods, we include public institutions as "soft" production factors and the public infrastructure as "hard" production factors. For both capital and labour, we distinguish between the regulation of the factor market, which determines access to the production factor, and the legal provisions that affect the factor price directly. Under technology we capture public spending on R&D. In the construction of our composite index of institutional competitiveness, these nine components represent the first hierarchical level of sub-indices.
SELECTION OF DATA
This section operationalises the structure of the Institutional Competitiveness Index (ICI) motivated through theory by backing up each of the sub-indices with empirical data. While it would be desirable to compile data that fully express the economic content of each of the subindices, this exercise is in reality strongly constrained by the availability of appropriate data sources. In addition, it should be recalled that our index intends to measure institutional competitiveness and not competitiveness overall. For example, in the case of labour cost the respective sub-index only includes taxation and not the net wage, or in the case of technology only public financing of technology is included but not the amount of patent applications.
In order to serve the purpose of our index, each of the variables we select fulfils the following criteria: 3. We gave preference to variables that were either collected in surveys or stem from Statistical Authorities. We use Eurostat, the OECD, the World Bank and the World Economic Forum as our main sources.
In some cases, we accepted variables that did not fully satisfy all three criteria if they added important information to the index and if we were convinced that this would not result in a deterioration of the overall results. When several redundant variables were available, we chose the one of highest quality judged by the above criteria. When several similar variables were available we accepted all of them under the same element. If we did not detect any variables of satisfying quality for some element of competitiveness we chose to drop that aspect from our definition, thus preferring a narrow definition at higher empirical quality over a broader definition at lower empirical quality. We did not impute any missing data. Moreover, for the purpose of comparison (see Section 4), we also use a Price Competitiveness Index (PCI) which includes factor prices and measures of innovation. For factor prices, we include the domestic credit to the private sector, the domestic credit granted by the banking sector, real unit labour costs, nominal unit labour costs, hourly earnings, the short-term interest rate and the long-term interest rate. To measure innovation, we include the number of internet users, the availability of latest technologies, firm-level technology absorption, FDI and technology transfer.
Finally, the Total Competitiveness Index (TCI) includes all of the above variables (both ICI and PCI variables). Perceptions of the quality of public services, the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies. 
NORMALISATION
We normalise all variables onto the same scale from 0 to 1 in order to make them comparable without losing information about the relative differences of data points between units and over time. Among the method available for normalisation, we prefer the min-max transformation as it relies on ancillary statistics that do not depend on any unknown population parameter. Hence, the min-max transformation can be computed by solely using the observations of the sample at hand (Wackerly et al., 2002) .
In particular we use a variant of the min-max method that selects the minimum and maximum of each indicator over both countries and years (OECD & JRC, 2008 ). This way not only crosssection but also time-series comparisons are made possible. The transformation function reads
where
observation of variable x r in country i at time t, with r ∈ R, the set of all variables that enter the index y r i,t observation of transformed indicator y r in country i at time t min δ (x r ) minimum of variable x r over δ, with δ = i or δ = t max δ (x r ) maximum of variable x r over δ, with δ = i or δ = t
As result of this transformation the largest realisation of x r is transformed to the value of 1, the smallest realisation receives the value of 0. Hence, the indicator y r varies between 0 and 1, which holds true for all r indicators.
On the downside, the min-max transformation suffers from sensitivity for large outliers. As outliers enter the scaling formula directly they significantly affect the representation of all other observations of the same variable. Fortunately, due to the macro nature of the data used in this study, an inspection of the dataset has not revealed any large outliers that would endanger the appropriate scaling of the variables involved. The distribution of the variables or indicators has not been corrected for skewedness. The descriptive statistics provided in Table 2 confirm that this is not necessary as the group as the group of countries in the sample is sufficiently homogenous.
WEIGHTING AND AGGREGATION
For the aggregation of variables to a sub-index or sub-sub-index, we use the arithmetic average as all indicators measure the same element of institutional competitiveness in a different way.
Likewise, all sub-sub-indices enter their sub-index as arithmetic average, and all sub-indices enter the overall index of institutional competitiveness in a simple arithmetic average. This choice is motivated by theoretical underpinning of our index and intends to give all components of the profit maximisation problem equal weight. In section 3, we conduct a factor decomposition analysis that shows that this assumption is justified and does not lead to the undue over-or under-representations of particular index components.
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
The resulting index ranges from 0.0327 to 0.9306 and has a mean of 0.5341 and a median of 0.5430. These descriptive statistics as well as those of the sub-index of the full composite index can be retrieved from Table 2 . Overall, the index values are very reasonable and unexpected values can be explained reasonably. The indices present little skewedness and it can be excluded that large outliers drive the data. Further descriptive statistics on the sub-sub-indices and individual variables in their original scaling and unit are provided in Table 10 and Table 11 in the annex. Notes: For some sub-indices the minimum and maximum equal the extremes of the index scale 0 and 1 respectively. This is only the case if an observation of the index exist for which all the underlying sub-indices and their respective underlying variables are also the minima and maxima.
In addition, Table 3 and Table 4 On an annual basis, the data base is somewhat thinner in the first half of the 1990s and in 2009. This is mainly driven by the low availability of some data sources during that period, which in particular affect the public institutions sub-index and the regulation of financial markets. The factor decomposition analysis in Section 4 highlights how this may drive the overall index. 
VALUE ADDED FROM THE INSTITUTIONAL COMPETITIVENESS INDEX
The common practice of constructing competitiveness indices does not sufficiently capture the political and institutional factors that determine a country's competitive position. Traditional competitiveness indices largely reflect factor price adjustments, while the Institutional Competitiveness Index (ICI) reflects policy adjustment.
As explained in Section 3, we have constructed the Total Competitiveness Index (TCI) to emulate the construction of other commonly used competitiveness indices by including political and institutional variables as well as variables related to factor prices. Consistent with the above assumption, the TCI is highly correlated with the WEF GCI, whereas the ICI is not as highly correlated with the WEF GCI (see Subsection 5.1). We pick the WEF GCI as an example because it is widely used.
Political and institutional variables play a significant role in determining a country's relative 
INSTITUTIONAL COMPETITIVENESS AND THE WEF GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS INDEX
To show similarities and differences between the Institutional Competitiveness Index (ICI) and traditional approaches to measuring competitiveness, we compare the widely-acknowledged WEF GCI with the Price Competitiveness Index (PCI), the ICI and the Total Competitiveness Index (TCI). First, the correlation is highest between the PCI and the WEF GCI. Second, the correlation is lower between the TCI and the WEF GCI. Third, the correlation is lowest between the ICI and the GCI.
To illustrate the correlation between the WEF and the TCI, we show the correlation for the last year in our sample: 2009. Source: WEF, own calculations. EMU countries: Belgium, Germany, Greece, Estonia, Ireland, Spain, France, Italy, Cyprus, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Slovenia, Slovakia, and Finland. Malta is excluded because of insufficient observations in the sub-categories. Non-EMU EU countries: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. The selection of non-EU OECD countries includes Australia, Canada, Switzerland, Iceland, Japan, Croatia, Norway, New Zealand, Turkey, and the United States.
The average correlation coefficient for years 2004 to 2009 is always highest for the correlation between PCI and WEF GCI, followed by the correlation between TCI and WEF GCI and the correlation is lowest for the ICI and the WEF GCI, as illustrated in table 5. As the average correlation is lowest for EMU countries for all three indices, PCI, ICI and TCI, the WEF GCI seems to capture fewer of the factors that play a role in EMU countries.
The lower correlation between the ICI and the WEF GCI confirms that the ICI measures a different trend. Since we include only one WEF indicator in the ICI, but none in the PCI, finding a lower correlation for the ICI than for the PCI may even seem surprising. This suggests that the factors driving the trend in the WEF GCI are related to factor prices rather than policy changes. 
FACTORS DRIVING COMPETITIVENESS
To evaluate the drivers of competitiveness we use a factor decomposition analysis that is usually applied to indicators of inequality (e.g. Shorrocks 1982 Shorrocks , 1980 Shorrocks , 1984 Shorrocks , 1988 Fields 2003) .
FACTOR DECOMPOSITION ANALYSIS
Our approach is similar to the decomposition by components (e.g. Shorrocks 1982), because we would like to analyse the extent to which a sub-component causes variation in the aggregate competitiveness index. Thus, we apply a factor decomposition approach to a measure of variance.
We do not have the usual problems related to choosing the optimal inequality measure for decomposition. Ideally, such an indicator has the properties useful for decomposition if it is a sum of contributing components. The ICI has such properties, because the sub-indicators are summed up and then normalised. Analogously to the requirements for the decomposition by components the variance of competitiveness increases if the variation in a sub-component increases.
Consider the following illustration, which is based on Shorrocks (1982 
This means that the contribution share of sub-component k is
We report these contribution shares in the tables below.
We apply the Shorrocks type decomposition to the variance of the respective competitiveness index. As our data set contains information on competitiveness by country and by year, we compute the variance over time and over countries. The variance over time indicates the most important drivers of competitiveness over time with the country-dimension fixed, while the variance over countries indicates the most important common driver. For the factor decomposition analysis, we look at the whole sample as well as sub-samples with the EMU, non-EMU EU and other OECD countries.
The linear structure of the decomposition by factor source is similar to a linear regression approach, which is why regression-based factor decomposition is common (Cowell and Fiorio 2009) . In this paper we use a regression-based factor-decomposition approach. Similar to the use of such methods for decomposing income by the contributions of different components we
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focus on the contribution of each sub-category to the variation in competitiveness. We estimate the following model: 
FACTOR DECOMPOSITION: USUAL MEASURES OF COMPETITIVENESS MASK DIFFERENCES IN INSTITUTIONAL VARIABLES
The usual non-institutional variables included in competitiveness indices reflect cross-country differences in development. Those variables typically include factor prices, like labour costs and interest rates, but also technological variables like the diffusion of technical knowledge or the distribution of internet coverage.
As shown in table 6, the variation between EMU, non-EMU and other OECD countries is largely driven by the infrastructure sub-indicator, which for the PCI only contains information on the number of internet users. We interpret the number of internet users as a proxy for heterogeneity in development, because it contributes more than 40% to the variation if we compare country groups (column 1), but only about 1% if we compare developments within countries, shown in in column (2). When we compare countries, it is possible that the contribution of internet users is even lower than shown in column (3), given that the residual contributes more than 95% in this case. Notes: Regression-based factor decomposition analysis with OLS. Coefficient and corresponding standard errors as well as factor shares can be obtained from the authors upon request. Column (1) gives the contributions to the variation between EMU, non-EMU EU and other OECD countries. Column (2) gives the contributions to the variation within a country in the sample over time. Column (3) gives the contributions to the variation between all countries in the sample for a given year.
The three most important drivers for the variation of a country's Total Competitiveness over time are domestic credit, short and long term interest rates and the taxation of goods and services, as shown in table 7 (column 2). Note that the names of the sub-indicators differ from the sub-indicators in the previous table. As we separate institutional components from price components in this decomposition, we have to use sub-sub-indicators for this decomposition.
The impact of the taxation of consumption, goods and services is lower than the impact of the factor price components. Yet, the contribution of the taxation of consumption, goods and services shows that political variables have an impact on the variation in competitiveness.
Political and institutional variables are the strongest driver of the variation of Total
Competitiveness between country groups (column 1). We find that the strictness of employment protection and the taxation of capital contribute between 16-17% to the variation in Total
Competitiveness between country groups. As political and institutional variables are similar within a region, the contrast in terms of these variables is stronger between country groups than between countries. This may explain the larger contribution of political and institutional variables to the regional variation in Total Competitiveness. The variation between countries (column 3) is overwhelmingly driven by what we take to be a proxy for economic development, followed by factor price variables. Notes: Regression-based factor decomposition analysis with OLS. Coefficient and corresponding standard errors as well as factor shares can be obtained from the authors upon request. Column (1) gives the contributions to the variation between EMU, non-EMU EU and other OECD countries. Column (2) gives the contributions to the variation within a country in the sample over time. Column (3) gives the contributions to the variation between all countries in the sample for a given year.
The ICI helps to detect the contribution of political and institutional variables that can otherwise be masked by country differences in economic development or factor price movements. While the between-country analysis in column (3) Notes: Regression-based factor decomposition analysis with OLS. Coefficient and corresponding standard errors as well as factor shares can be obtained from the authors upon request. Column (1) gives the contributions to the variation between EMU, non-EMU EU and other OECD countries. Column (2) gives the contributions to the variation within a country in the sample over time. Column (3) gives the contributions to the variation between all countries in the sample for a given year. Member States could be related to the intensified need to improve the institutional framework in response to the closer ties among EMU Member States. Moreover, the starting points for institutional reforms were substantially different: the non-EMU EU sample includes many countries from Central and Eastern Europe which, after the fall of the Iron Curtain, underwent significant institutional change and improved their institutional frameworks significantly, while EMU countries started from a higher level so that institutional change occurred in a more incremental manner. In short, while EMU gained in relative Factor Price Competitiveness, it lost in relative Institutional Competitiveness.
COMPETITIVENESS BETWEEN COUNTRY GROUPS
Notwithstanding differences between EMU and non-EMU EU countries, we would expect
Institutional Competitiveness developments within EMU to be uneven, as a consequence of systems competition. As explained in Section 2, systems competition comes into effect when sovereign states form a common market and factors of production can move across borders without constraints (Sinn 2003) . By virtue of the EU Treaties, free movement of products, services, labour and capital should hold for every country within the EU. However, progress in achieving these four freedoms has been uneven. While capital controls were officially abolished already in 1990, marking the start of the EMU process, labour market restrictions have only been lifted gradually and are still in place for some of the new Member States. 2 In addition to these formal restrictions, a number of other barriers (e.g. difficulties in the cross-border transfer of pension claims, language barriers) also work against full labour mobility in the Single Market. As a consequence, effects of EMU on labour markets should not be expected to be as clear-cut as the effects triggered by the abolition of capital controls on capital markets (see
Subsection 4.4). Our observation of more limited relative improvements in Institutional
Competitiveness in EMU is in line with the uneven achievement of all four freedoms.
We argue that the two observations on Factor Price Competitiveness and Institutional
Competitiveness are linked. In fact, the limited achievement of all of the four freedoms could be related to increased competition among EMU Member States. As a consequence of the increased mobility of factors, especially capital, governments enter systems competition and need to improve their institutional set-up in order to attract production factors. Governments' response to systems competition can however lead to increased instead of decreased domestic market protection. The ICI helps to isolate the components that drive such developments. 
INSTITUTIONAL COMPETITIVENESS AND SYSTEMS COMPETITION
While we can map competitiveness developments over time for the sub-indicators in the ICI, we cannot draw conclusions about the effects of system competition within EMU. The theoretical predictions of the systems competition literature suggest that, first, systems competition is stronger where the factors of production are more mobile (e.g. Sinn 1997) . For example, a higher mobility of capital should lead to stronger systems competition in the capital, as opposed to more limited effects of system competition in labour markets which remain more regulated.
Against this background we evaluate whether Institutional Competitiveness in terms of capital taxation has increased more strongly than Institutional Competitiveness in terms of labour taxation. However, while higher competitiveness is associated with lower taxes, this does not need to be the most efficient outcome in terms of social welfare. .7
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. The comparison of competitiveness in terms of labour taxation vs. capital taxation suggests that the lack of systems competition in labour markets may be a reason for more heterogeneity in labour market competitiveness within EMU. The importance of competitiveness in product market regulation, infrastructure and technology hints to a significant impact of competition in the single market. However, Figure 6 also indicates important differences between countries.
While developments in infrastructure followed a similar trend, R&D spending seems to have converged. In contrast, developments in social security have diverged, while persistent differences are visible in labour market regulation. For explaining intra-EMU differences, these developments deserve a closer look. While the Institutional Competitiveness Index can serve as a helpful tool for doing so, such a detailed analysis is beyond the scope of this paper.
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CONCLUSIONS
Competitiveness is often perceived as the silver bullet in the quest to reduce fiscal deficits and current account imbalances in Europe. However, it is not clear to which extent governments can influence overall competitiveness by setting policy variables. Still, this is of utmost importance when giving policy recommendations. Therefore, it is important to measure competitiveness not in terms of factor flows -like current account deficits and surpluses, which are commonly included in competitiveness indices -but in terms of the causes for such developments. The theory of systems competition gives guidance regarding the aspects that determine a country's competitive position, which a government can influence: institutional variables, eventually to attract investment. We have developed a new index of institutional competitiveness for the EU and some OECD countries that includes all variables available to governments, but not such variables that merely capture factor price adjustments, as these factor price adjustments can either be the result of the setting of policy variables or even the result of an economic adjustment process.
The Institutional Competitiveness Index goes beyond the usual approaches in that it measures the effects governments can have on competitiveness. We argue that for well-founded policy recommendations, the political dimension should be evaluated separately from factor pricedriven developments. This becomes all the more important in the context of the new EMU governance framework, which includes a Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure that, if such imbalances become excessive and agreed policy recommendations are not followed, can lead to sanctions for the EMU country concerned.
A first look at the developments of the index and its sub-indices suggests that system competition among EMU countries had a stronger impact in areas that are of particular relevance for the single market such as infrastructure, and in areas where the single market had been most consistently implemented, in particular capital movements. In these areas, 
